Performing public credit at the eighteenth-century Bank of England
Credit was the foundation on which eighteenth-century Britain's economic and geopolitical success was built and much scholarly effort has been spent in seeking to understand how it operated.
1 Yet, despite this outpouring of interest, the most important of the myriad of eighteenth-century credit relationships -that between the public creditors and the state -has been neglected. We know that the national debt rose significantly over the course of the long eighteenth century exceeding £800 million by the end of the Napoleonic Wars. We know that the majority of the debt was held by individual Britons. Yet we know little of why those many thousands of public creditors trusted their capital to the eighteenth-century state and how they reached their decisions so to do. This article explores those issues.
The issue of trust in personal credit relationships has been addressed in seminal works by Craig Muldrew and Margot Finn. They differed in their chronological focus, emphasis and sources but their conclusions were not incompatible. Both emphasised the 'persistently social character' of economic relationships, whether they saw that sociability embedded in personal and community relations or based on evaluations of the outward signs of personal character.
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There was also an agreement that, by whatever means, systems of credit encouraged individuals to behave in certain ways and marked people out when they did not behave in those ways. Even 'ill reports' could ruin a tradesman and, once lost, reputation was not easily recovered. 3 Arguments about the ways in which the need to demonstrate credit-worthiness shaped behaviour also have been made with regard to the state. In the True Briton in 1723 the link between reputation and the operation of public credit was very explicitly drawn. It was stated:
there must be an Appearance of Honesty at least, to raise this Credit to any considerable Height, so as to be lasting. The People or Nation that are Ambitious of it, should bear the nicest Reputation in the World; [they must] have every commendable Quality which embellishes Mankind. 4 Modern scholars have also been concerned with these questions. Douglass North and Barry
Weingast's 1989 article 'Constitutions and Commitment' and work that has followed has shown that the need to maintain significant funding streams shaped behaviour. 5 In order to build a reputation as a sound borrower, a state had to offer certain rights to its creditors and thus accept constraints on its own behaviour. 6 It had to maintain a degree of transparency in its financial dealings, to allocate revenue streams for the repayment of debts and, of course, to repay those debts on time. In this way a state built a sound reputation and ultimately reduced the costs of its borrowing.
In the case of the British state, there is evidence to demonstrate that this was a conscious process. From the turn of the eighteenth century successive governments sought, when 12 If this analysis is accepted, however, it means that public credit lay 'beneath the threshold of representation on its own terms', and thus it needed to be mediated and understood through social, political and economic discussion, chiefly in print, and most often through fictional and allegorical representations.
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Although I agree that fictional and allegorical representations of credit were important in shaping ways of understanding the state's credit-worthiness, I explicitly reject the notion that the national debt was an absence, impossible to observe. In this article I will offer an alternative view: a view of public credit witnessed, public credit as tangible display, and public credit as public performance. This performance was located at the Bank of England and witnessed by the 'citizen creditor'. What follows will show that the Bank of England acted to embody public credit through its architecture, internal structures, through the very visible actions of its clerks and the technologies that they used to record ownership and transfer of the national debt, and through the accommodation of the financial market within its walls. The Bank, by those means, allowed public creditors to interact with each other and to interrogate the financial stability and reputation of the state in the same ways that they could interrogate the integrity of a potential private borrower.
THE 'CITIZEN CREDITOR' AT THE BANK
Far too little is known about who owned the national debt during the long eighteenth century.
Contemporary analyses were generally polemical and 'did not attain great precision'. to extract favourable terms. 24 Notably absent from those negotiations was any consideration of the public creditors. Yet, as Natalie Roxburgh asserts in her persuasive work on the representations of public credit, the Bank, and its continuing management of the national debt, did form part of an inferred 'contract' between the public creditors and the state. It was a contract that implied 'an economy of mutual benefit' and through which the state could be held to account to keep the promises that underpinned public credit. 25 That the Bank's directors recognised the role that was attributed to them is clear from in a report produced at the Bank in 1783 by a group of directors in which the authors reminded their colleagues of the immense importance of the Bank of England not only to the City of London, in points highly essential to the promotion & extension of its Commerce, but to the Nation at large, as the grand Palladium of Public Credit, we cannot but be thoroughly persuaded that an Object so great in itself & so interesting to all Ranks of the Community, must necessarily excite care & solicitude in every breast, for the wise administration of its Affairs, but principally and directly in theirs who are entrusted with the immediate management of them: We deem it therefore superfluous to say a single word to the Court with a view of inculcating a religious Veneration for the glorious fabrick, or of recommending a steady and unremitting attention to its sacred Preservation.
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The Bank was, therefore, the place most persistently associated with public credit and the place at which the majority of public creditors managed their dealings in the national debt.
The institution's roles in this respect were asserted by a variety of commentators and accepted by the Bank directors themselves. The symbiotic relationship was such that many accepted the Bank's right to represent the state in matters of public credit. Indeed, Richard Price, writing in 1774, acknowledged that 'more depends at present on the wisdom and good conduct of the BANK DIRECTORS than on the whole Legislature. One wrong step in them would undo us'. The following sections will turn to the question of how the Bank's directors demonstrated that their 'wisdom and good conduct' could be relied upon.
ARCHITECTURAL MESSAGES
In a recent intervention, Tawny Paul has discussed how knowledge of an individual and their worth was used to give substance to lending decisions. In her analysis of North Atlantic trading relationships, she emphasised that creditors who brought debtors to court had a clear sense of their economic worth 'from the physical property they owned, to the specie they possessed, to the obligations they were owed, to the wages they derived from their occupations'. Street.
The Threadneedle Street site was purpose-built and designed by the architect George
Sampson. Within, the private space was larger than the public space and the Pay Hall (the commercial public area where London's business community came to make deposits and withdrawals, discount bills of exchange and exchange specie for the Bank's own notes) was larger than the transfer and stock offices. 34 In other words the Bank of England by the 1730s was still more concerned with its commercial role than its role as part of the fiscal-military state. Nonetheless, when designing the new buildings that made up the Bank during the eighteenth century, there is evidence to suggest that both its architects and its directors were concerned with the image its buildings and their adornments presented to the public. The scholarly literature that emphasises the importance of the connections between the public creditors and Parliament, asserts that it was the security of a 'national' debt under the control of Parliament, rather than subject to the whims of the monarch, that conferred 'credible commitment' that those debts would be repaid. 39 Nonetheless, the Bank did, and indeed had since its foundation in 1694, emphasised its connections to the Court as well as Parliament.
The Bank's buildings were not ostentatious but its Palladian façade was an obvious physical contrast to the high and narrow brick, wood and stucco buildings that surrounded it.
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As such, the Bank attracted attention. 43 Although of fashionably classical design, the Bank was an imposing, and some might have said intimidating, structure. Because of the need for security, there were no windows facing the street at ground-floor level so passers-by were presented with an elegant but essentially blank façade. Iain Black labels those windowless walls 'exclusionary', linking them to the Bank's aggressive protection of its privileges and monopoly position. 44 This view has some merit. The needs of security were relentlessly pursued during the period of expansion the Bank underwent from the 1730s to the end of the eighteenth century. This is evident in both the design of the new buildings and in the approach to the Bank's neighbours in and around Threadneedle Street. With regard to the latter, the Bank's directors took a number of measures during the mid-to late-eighteenth century to secure the surrounding buildings and land. In doing so, they made much of the need to enlarge the streets and passages around Threadneedle Street, making them more 'commodious' for visitors and customers. 45 But it is clear that risk-management, rather than convenience, was the priority.
When this issue was raised during the 1760s, it was observed that the roads around Threadneedle Street were still too narrow and too close to the Bank with the risk that, especially in case of a fire, 'buildings, papers and property…may be in danger of being destroyed to the irretrievable loss of the publick'. 46 The effect of the clearance of the streets around the Bank was not only greater security from fire but also a building that stood out in its environment. Although the building may have been in some ways reminiscent of a fortress, it did send another clear message to those who used its services: capital invested here will be secure. This was certainly a message embedded in images and descriptions of the Bank but it was also a physical and visual experience available to visitors to the institution and its environs. The messages within the Bank's architecture were that it was both secure in the sense of being defended and defensible but also secure from the excesses and speculation that were synonymous with finance. 48 Equally, Walcot notes that in contemporary architectural theory, the appearance of a building equated to the appearance of an individual 'in its potential to reveal character'.
Thus in Roger North's late seventeenth-century architectural treatise it was argued that:
I can shew you a man's character in his house. If he hath bin given to parsimony or profusion, to judge rightly or superficially, to deal in great matters of small, high or low, his edifices shall be tincted accordingly, and the justness or imperfection of his mind will appear in them. While the exterior of the Bank communicated a message of security, the fortress analogy cannot be pushed too far because its buildings were essentially public spaces. This meant a careful balance between security and access. The decisions made in the aftermath of the Gordon Riots, which constituted a significant threat to the Bank, are illustrative of this point. From the late autumn of 1780 a military guard was stationed at the Bank during the hours of darkness.
This move was resisted by the City's authorities who complained that it was a violation of its ancient privileges. The Directors' response was curt, the Guard was they said 'highly approved in foreign countries, and there considered as a great security to the property of the Stockholders…And that the majority of the Proprietors [shareholders] appeared to be pleased with it'. 50 The Guard, therefore, would stay, and indeed was not removed until 1973, but when a military engineer told the Directors to erect 'strong and high' walls topped by 'flanking towers sufficiently high to command the roofs', it was a step too far. 51 The Bank had to be seen to be accessible to all, during office hours at least. And despite the attention of numerous doormen and porters, there is plenty of evidence that all manner of individuals did enter the Bank. Many sources emphasized the crowds and confusion in its public spaces. Thomas Mortimer's advice to visitors to the Bank's transfer offices was to 'be not dismayed at the wild uproar, and confused noise which will at first strike your astonished senses'. Exchange and Sun Assurance companies. 58 Indeed, the late eighteenth-century Bank of England was undoubtedly the largest private employer of white-collar workers in Britain, if not the world.
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ORGANISATIONAL MESSAGES
By the late eighteenth century, the largest office in the Bank was that which managed business in the 3% consols, the most ubiquitous and easily transferable of the instruments of the national debt. It is possible to reconstruct its business from the reports of a Committee of
Inspection that was appointed in 1783. 59 That report shows there were 54 clerks at work in the office operating 22 ledgers & alphabets, 24 dividend books and 48 transfer books. 60 Their work was specialised, as was the work of their fellows throughout the Bank. It was also coordinated within and between offices to ensure efficient delivery of the service. 61 Work at the Bank was efficient. Defoe offered the institution as a model for those in business to follow noting that its 'business is dispatch'd with such Exactness, and such
Expedition and so much of it too…no Confusion, nobody is either denied or delayed
Payment…No Accounts in the World are more exactly kept, no Place in the World has so much Business done, with so much ease.' 62 Lord North in 1781 praised its 'prudent management…judicious conduct, wise plans and exact punctuality'. 63 Punctuality which equated also to accessibility was important and was emphasised in numerous publications.
Almanacs contained lists of opening hours at the Bank and offices of the other monied companies. The Kentish Companion: or useful Memorandum and Account Book offered in its
opening section 'An exact Account of the Days and Hours for buying and accepting, or selling and transferring, the several Stocks, or Government Securities'. 64 The Bank was indeed reliable in this respect. It operated six days a week from 9.00am to 5.00pm in most offices and it was often kept open for business on public holidays, mainly to facilitate commercial customers who wanted to discount bills or exchange or draw notes. It had set hours for the transfers of ownership of stock and for the collection of dividends. 65 Much effort went into maintaining a prompt service. Clerks in the 3% consols office claimed there was 'a constant rule in this Office to make no distinctions of persons, but to dispatch every one in the order he comes, as far as they are able to judge'. 66 Clerks were, therefore, outwardly at least, concerned with ensuring that delays were suffered equally regardless of social status or other distinction.
The Bank's work was also transparent. Its public-facing business took place in openplan offices which allowed the process of maintaining and recording ownership of the public debt to be observed. 67 Ledgers were carefully kept and show very few errors or crossings-out and they could be called upon by customers who wished to observe their account and by notaries and attorneys acting on their client's behalf. Indeed, the clerks reporting to the Committee of Inspection emphasised that the notaries who came to inspect the foreign accounts did so daily at around 5 o'clock and that they expected to find the records up to date. 68 As
Roxburgh asserts, the positioning of the clerks and their ledgers in the public's view said something about not just the procedures that could be witnessed but also those that were performed behind closed doors. 69 The Bank was also visibly secure in not just its external façade but also in its internal systems. This was particularly necessary because the Bank operated what was known as the inscribed stock system, which simply meant that the transfer of any holding out of a stockholder's name was achieved by record in the Bank's books and that the stock-holder's title was evidenced only by entries in the Bank's books. Thus no stock certificate was issued and although receipts were issued, these were only to act as a memorandum for the stock-holder.
They were in no way legally binding. 70 The advantages of this system were that it was simple, quick and straight-forward. It fulfilled all the requirements then for the support of a liquid and efficient market. Moreover, no consequence was attached to the loss or theft of a stock receipt since the Bank itself held the only legally binding record of ownership. 71 But it meant that any public creditor entrusting their business to an agent had to be very sure of their good faith. And it meant that the pressure on the Bank to maintain accurate records and to protect those records was tremendous.
As such, security procedures to eliminate mistakes and prevent the loss of records were numerous. Each day an abstract of all transfers made was taken and put into the mail to be removed from the Bank overnight as a precaution against the loss of the records due to fire or some other accident. 72 Records that had to remain in the Bank overnight were stored in wheeled trucks that could be easily rolled out the Bank in an emergency. 73 The paper record of the Bank's business, the same paper record that could be observed by the public creditors, was to be protected at all costs. There were certainly gaps in the system, such as the failure to check signatures prior to the transfer of debt but the majority of procedures were consistent with maintaining the integrity of the record of the public debt whilst still providing a speedy service 70 BEA, AC4/5, An outline of the history and working of the inscribed stock system, fo. 2. 71 Ibid., fo. 3. So efficient was this system that it remained in place until the late nineteenth century. 72 The public creditors would have participated in these procedures. They, like the Bank's clerks, were part of the performance of maintaining public credit. But the Bank not only engaged in physical and easily-interpreted displays of public credit, for those schooled by
Addison's Spectator to look for allegorical representations of credit-worthiness the institution did not disappoint. Britannia became the Bank's symbol at its foundation in 1694 and in addition to being depicted in statuary, she was placed on all banknotes, on a variety of other documents issued by the Bank, and she was stamped on ledgers, transfers book and on the Bank's gold ingots. The Bank's Britannia would have been seen daily by its clerks, and she was in evidence for those who visited the Bank and those who used its notes, whether or not they visited the institution. Because of the ubiquity of the image of Britannia in other fora, she also cemented the Bank's links to both nation and public credit. Britannia was an image used 74 BEA, M5/213, fo. 23. 75 Defoe, Complete English Tradesman, 324.
repeatedly from 1688 as an emblem of the Protestant nation and she retained a strong connection to monarchy, in particular being associated with Elizabeth I throughout the long eighteenth century. 76 She was also used frequently to depict the state of the nation. Although Britannia remained an exemplary figure and, whether depicted as strong or vulnerable, was always above reproach. Lady Credit, on the other hand, was intensely volatile: one moment your friend and the next turning away from you. Borrowers were warned that you must be 'very tender of her for if you overload her, she's a coy mistress-she'll slip from you without any warning, and you'll be undone from that moment. 78 Joseph Addison also depicted the 'quick Turns and Changes in [Credit's] Constitution' and her tendency to 'fall away from the most florid complexion…and wither into a Skeleton'. 79 Sherman shows that Lady Credit quickly became depicted as a whore at the fall of a speculative market. 80 This inconstancy was applied not only to the imaginary Lady Credit but to the very real South Sea Company in the wake of the Bubble's bursting in 1720. Thus, one commentator raged:
The Chief Managers of a certain Stock may dress up their Darling Mistress once more, and send her into the World not without a tempting Aspect; but People who have already been Sufferers by their Schemes, will look upon her with a cautious Eye. A fine Lady, who had deceiv'd a Man once, will for the Future be treated as a common Prostitute. likelihood of imminent state bankruptcy. 85 Tax funds that were supposed to support the debt were often underpaid, even towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the midst of the War of American Independence the tax funds allocated to pay the debts incurred stood in arrears to the tune of more than £2,000,000 and outstanding exchequer bills, issued in anticipation of tax revenues stood at £4.5 million, while the taxes budgeted to cover were supposed to yield £2.5 million and it was known that the funds, the land and the malt tax, usually fell short. 86 Property rights were violated in numerous ways, sometimes with the best of intentions. Henry Pelham's conversion of the outstanding debt in 1750, which created the 3% consolidated annuities, is a case in point. At that time the interest paid to the public creditors was forcibly lowered and the terms of their loans renegotiated. 87 The resolution of the South Sea Scheme had required similar sacrifices. 88 Julian Hoppit has uncovered a number of cases throughout the eighteenth century in which the property rights of British subjects were undermined, noting that 'to them there was precious little "credible commitment"'. 89 The integrity of the public funds was, therefore, at risk and did need to be demonstrated. The Bank's role and the transparency, regularity and efficiency of its management of the debt was, therefore, very necessary.
MANAGING THE MARKET
In one part of the Bank, however, the demonstrations of trustworthiness were compromised.
Although the habit is of unknown origin, stockbrokers regularly used the transfer offices of the Bank of England, the South Sea Company and the East India Company as marketplaces. 90 The
Bank of England was the largest of those spaces because it was the primary manager of the state's debt but also because it provided a dedicated space for trading. Robert Taylor 99 This fascination with the market is also expressed through its presentation in fiction and in the theatre. As Leemans suggests, bourses and exchanges provided a rich environment for playwrights lending them lively, noisy and fastpaced scenes and numerous stereotypes to draw on. 100 Such plays were a popular draw for audiences and performed numerous functions, including informing audiences what speculation was all about, providing explanations of the schemes put forward by speculators and, of course, providing a moral for their audiences when speculations collapsed.
From the Bank's perspective, however, the performance in the Rotunda needed to be managed. The Directors were well aware that the financial market was a compromised space, not just a danger to the physical security of its participants but also a danger to the security of Aware of the apparent dangers of the market, the Bank's directors tried to ensure its two businesses did not mix. nearly all the clerks interviewed admitted some involvement in the market. They all also attempted to claim that they did not know of any order against acting as a broker. 107 This seems disingenuous at best. Samuel Beachcroft's governor's diary, which covered the period from 1775 to 1777, contained a number of references to anonymous informers against clerks acting as jobbers and brokers, suggesting that this kind of activity was brought to the Bank's attention on a regular basis. 108 now argued that the maintenance of public credit depended on the secondary market. 109 A liquid market facilitated the negotiation of value of the state's offerings, gave the public creditors a forum for expressing their views through the purchase and sale of securities and kept the state aware of market opinion through price movements. An active secondary market also encouraged a broad range of investors who were willing to make both short-and longterm investments in the debt. Even during the early eighteenth century the national debt was used not just by speculators but also for the purposes of creating nest-eggs, dowries, retirement funds and facilitating intergenerational transfers. This diversity of actors and interests created a market which gave public creditors the assurance that they could liquidate their holdings at will. This was clearly understood by contemporary commentators on the national debt who extolled the virtues of an open market where people could complete their transactions with 'ease, readiness and dispatch' and 'change their Property without Difficulty, and at a Small Expense'. 110 It also offers a stark contradiction to Pocock's argument discussed in the opening section of this article, that, since debt would not be repaid, the nation's debt, and thus the state itself, was subject to the 'investor's imagination' of a moment that could never exist in reality. 111 Of course, it mattered very little for the individual investor whether the debt would ever be repaid. Their concern was simply whether dividends were paid on time and whether the debt could be alienated at will. At the Bank, courtesy of its accommodation of an otherwise troublesome financial market, the latter would be realised with ease. In the Rotunda, the 'imaginary' which so troubled Pocock became noisy, aggressive, risky, somewhat unsavoury, but remarkably efficient, reality.
CONCLUSION
By 1819 Britain's debts stood at £844,000,000 much of it held by the 'citizen creditor'. The relationship between the citizen creditor and the state was, therefore, the most important credit relationship of this period. Yet, the manifest contemporary uses of allegory to describe public credit have led literary critics -the scholars who have engaged most often with these issuesto characterise public credit as something imagined. Representations of credit certainly mattered. They appeared in many media: novels, the theatre, satire, ballads and poetry. They had impact, especially during times of crisis. They had an educative value, teaching the public how to view credit and introducing ways of understanding the actions of financiers. But we should not neglect the other lessons writ on the sites where credit was performed and which demonstrated an alternative view of public credit as worthy of the trust and investment of the 'citizen creditor'. At the Bank of England, public creditors could experience, witness and even be entertained by the operation and performance of public credit. This told them something about the credit-worthiness of the state and, crucially, it did so in ways that they were used to trusting when assessing private credit.
At the Bank the public creditors' gaze was drawn to the crowds symbolizing a body of agreement about the reputation of the borrower; they could observe the physical appearance of the borrower: solid, affluent, but not ostentatious enough to prompt concerns about profligacy;
and they could witness the integrity of the borrower, symbolized by the transparency and regularity of the Bank's book-keeping processes. In some ways this was compromised by the presence of the market at the Bank but in other ways the power of the market reinforced relevant messages. Of course, it was deeds that mattered in the end. The fact that the state continued to pay interest on its debts was the factor that ultimately made its financial promises credible. But the Bank also served as the site where the public creditor and the potential public creditor could witness that in operation. The Bank of England, therefore, in its external and internal architecture, in the iconography that it used, in the way it organised its offices and businesses and in the, perhaps deliberate, personification of the Bank as Britannia offered important ways for the public creditors to observe, explore and test the reputation and creditworthiness of the state. It also offers an important way for scholars of the Financial Revolution to challenge ideas of anxiety around the world of public credit. Read through representations and paper, public credit seems ephemeral and problematic. Read through the Palladian architecture of the Bank and the technologies used by its clerks, public credit is endowed with a permanence and solidity that allows us to appreciate how and why many thousands of public creditors were willing to invest in the British state.
